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BANKRUPTCY LAW
Section 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1990),
(section 707(b)), allows the United States trustee in a bankruptcy proceeding
to file a motion to dismiss the case if granting relief would contradict the
import of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. One court has interpreted
this statute to allow the trustee to raise a motion to dismiss even when a
creditor initially has proposed the idea to the trustee.6 2 However, at least
one court and one treatise writer have concluded that section 707(b) precludes the trustee from raising the motion to dismiss a bankruptcy action
when an interested party's suggestion initially prompts the trustee's action. 63
Additionally, the courts are divided on whether a trustee has standing
to appeal the denial of a section 707(b) motion considering that the Bankruptcy Code does not expressly give the trustee the power to appeal. Courts
generally determine if a party has standing in bankruptcy cases by applying
the "person aggrieved" test.6 To achieve "person aggrieved" status a party
must be directly injured pecuniarily. 6 United States trustees cannot meet
this standard because they never have a pecuniary interest in the bankruptcy
proceeding. However, other standards may apply to a party such as a
trustee. 6 In In re Clark, 927 F.2d 793 (4th Cir. 1991), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit confronted the issues of whether
a trustee may raise a section 707(b) motion when an interested party
originally proposes the motion to the trustee, and whether a trustee has
standing to appeal a court's denial of a section 707(b) motion.
After Cleatus Clark filed a voluntary petition for relief pursuant to
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, one of Clark's creditors sent the trustee
a letter informing the trustee that Clark's statements about his income and
expenses might be inaccurate. The letter asked the trustee to consider filing
a section 707(b) motion to dismiss Clark's petition for "substantial abuse."
After an investigation of Clark, the trustee filed a section 707(b) motion to
dismiss. The bankruptcy court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order
dismissing the trustee's motion because the motion appeared to originate
with Great Western, one of Clark's creditors. The court interpreted section
707(b) as barring the trustee from instituting a "substantial abuse" motion
at the suggestion of a creditor, who is a party in interest. The trustee then

62. See In re Busbin, 95 B.R. 240, 242 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989) (holding that trustee
can bring § 707(b) motion to dismiss at suggestion of creditor).
63. See In re Restea, 76 B.R. 728, 733 (Bankr. D.S.D 1987) (holding that trustee cannot
enter motion to dismiss when action was originally suggested by party in interest); 4 COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY § 707.05 at 707-16 (15th ed. 1990).
64. In re Clark, 927 F.2d 793, 795 (4th Cir. 1991).
65. In re Fondiller, 707 F.2d 441, 442 (9th Cir. 1983).
66. See SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 460 (1940)
(holding that "party aggrieved" standard could be satisfied when party had official duty to
enforce bankruptcy law in public interest); In re Revco D.S., Inc., 898 F.2d 498, 499-500 (6th
Cir. 1990) (holding that U.S. trustee had standing because of his official duty to enforce
bankruptcy law in public interest).
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appealed the bankruptcy court's ruling to the Western District Court of
Virginia. The district court dismissed the appeal, holding that the trustee
did not have standing to appeal the bankruptcy court's denial of a section
707(b) motion.
In In re Revco D.S., Inc., 898 F.2d 498 (6th Cir. 1990), the Sixth
Circuit had used the official duty standard to hold that a United States
trustee had appellate standing. The district court had distinguished SEC v.
United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434 (1940), from the
case at bar, reasoning that in U.S. Realty the SEC had a right to intervene
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24. Therefore, the SEC had appellate
standing where an adverse ruling affected a public interest which the SEC
had a duty to protect. The district court then concluded that because the
trustee had no similar right of intervention, the trustee could not appeal
the bankruptcy court's ruling.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit first addressed the trustee's standing to
appeal the bankruptcy court's dismissal of the section 707(b) motion. The
Clark court, relying on. In re Fondiller, 707 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1983),
acknowledged that a trustee could not satisfy the normal aggrieved person
appellate standing test because the trustee could not be directly and pecuniarily injured. The court then noted that in United States Realty &
Improvement Co., the United States Supreme Court had held that standing
to appeal could also arise out of a party's official duty to enforce the
bankruptcy law in the public interest. The Fourth Circuit held that the
absence of a right of intervention was not crucial. Instead, the court
compared the trustee's and the SEC's respective duties to enforce the law
in the public interest. The court reasoned that because the trustee had a
statutory right to bring a section 707(b) motion, he did not need a right of
intervention. The court then stated that if a trustee alleges that the bankruptcy court's ruling has interfered with the trustee's statutory duty then
the trustee has standing to appeal that ruling under the United States Realty
rationale.
The court further opined that section 307, 11 U.S.C. § 307 (1990), gives
the trustee appellate standing because section 307 grants the trustee the right
to appear and be heard in any Title 11 case or proceeding. Even though
the trustee had no pecuniary interest in the suit, the House of Representatives
67
report on section 307 noted that the section granted the trustee standing.
Finally, the court reasoned that if Congress had intended to limit the
trustee's appellate standing it would have explicitly excluded the right as
Congress. had done with certain agencies in numerous sections of the
Bankruptcy Code. Thus, the court held that the trustee had standing to
appeal the bankruptcy court's decision.
After dispensing with the district court's refusal to allow the trustee to
appeal, the court turned to the trustee's right to bring a section 707(b)
motion to dismiss. Section 707(b) states:
67. H.R.
5240.

REP.

No. 764, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 27, reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5227,
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After notice and a hearing, the court, on its own motion or on a
motion by the United States trustee, but not at the request or
suggestion of any party in interest, may dismiss a case filed by an
individual debtor under this chapter whose debts are primarily
consumer debts if it finds that the granting of relief would be a
substantial abuse of the provisions of this chapter. There shall be
a presumption in favor of granting the relief requested by the
debtor.
11 U.S.C. § 707(b). The bankruptcy court held that the trustee could not
make a motion to dismiss under section 707(b) if a party in interest had
previously suggested that the trustee do so. The Fourth Circuit, however,
interpreted the phrase "but not at the request or suggestion of any party
in interest" to modify what the court itself can do, because "the court" is
the subject of the sentence. Therefore, the court held that section 707(b)
bars the court from dismissing a debtor's Chapter 7 petition only if a party
in interest suggests to the court as opposed to the trustee that a section
707(b) motion should be made. The court stated that section 707(b) does
not bar the trustee from making a motion at the suggestion of a creditor
and does not bar the court from considering such a motion.
The court contended that this reading of section 707(b) will avoid
creditor harassment of debtors because the trustee must make an independent
judgment about filing a 707(b) motion to dismiss after receiving the suggestion from an interested party. Thus, the Fourth Circuit overruled the
bankruptcy court, holding that the trustee could make a section 707(b)
motion to dismiss even though an interested party had previously suggested
the action to the trustee.
Section 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code (the Code), 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)
(1990), permits a court to dismiss a debtor's Chapter 7 bankruptcy suit, on
the court's or the United States trustee's motion, if it finds that granting
relief would constitute "substantial abuse" of the Code. Courts have been
struggling to define "substantial abuse" since 1984, when Congress amended
the 1078 Bankruptcy Code to include section 707(b). Congress intended the
amendment to address the conflicting interests of debtors who desire a fresh
financial start, and creditors who complain of abuses of the bankruptcy
proceeding by non-needy debtors. Congress, however, did not define the
phrase "substantial abuse," and courts have applied either a per se rule or
a totality of the circumstances analysis to the dismissal question.68 Under

68. Compare In re Kelly, 841 F.2d 908, 914 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding debtor's ability to
pay debts, standing alone is sufficient justification to deny Chapter 7 petition under § 707(b))
and In re Edwards, 50 B.R. 933, 936 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that ability to pay
100% of debts in three years constitutes substantial abuse under § 707(b)) and In re Struggs,
71 B.R. 96, 97 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987) (holding that debtor who can repay debt under
Chapter 13 plan should have Chapter 7 petition dismissed) with In re Shands, 63 B.R. 121,
124 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985) (holding ability to pay 100% within three years, when combined
with other egregious circumstances, sufficient to deny Chapter 7 relief) and In re Peluso, 72
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the per se rule, a substantial abuse exists if a debtor's income exceeds his
necessary expenses. The totality of the circumstances approach requires a
court to consider additional factors such as illness, unemployment and the
debtor's good faith, in determining whether the bankruptcy petition constitutes a substantial abuse of the bankruptcy proceedings.
In In re Green, 934 F.2d 568 (4th Cir. 1991), the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered which approach was more
appropriate for a court's consideration of dismissal under section 707(b).
In Green, the debtor filed a petition for Chapter 7 bankruptcy relief with
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland. The
bankruptcy court held a hearing at which Green testified that he had $40,000
in unsecured debt, consisting mostly of a credit union loan and department
store and consumer loan debts. He also had an income of at least $638 a
month in excess of his necessary expenses. Having held the same job as a
bus driver for 13 years, Green's 1988 income was ($46,000. A substantial
amount of that income was attributable to overtime pay. Green, however,
had injured his leg and would not be able to earn overtime pay in the
future. He estimated that his income in 1989 would be only $26,000.
The United States trustee moved for dismissal of Green's petition and
the bankruptcy court granted the motion. Applying the per se rule, the
bankruptcy court reasoned that the income in excess of necessary expenses
was, by itself, sufficient to constitute a substantial abuse of Chapter 7. The
district court affirmed, holding that excessive monthly income could serve
as the sole basis for finding substantial abuse. Green appealed this decision
to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.
On appeal, the United States trustee argued that the per se rule that
the lower courts had applied was the proper method of interpreting "substantial abuse" under section 707(b). In applying the per se rule, the lower
courts had relied on In re Kelly, 841 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1988). In Kelly,
the debtor had an excess of income over expenditures of $440 per month,
and the court found that they could repay ninety-nine percent of their
unsecured debt out of disposable income in three years. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted that the principal factor for
several courts considering dismissal of a Chapter 7 petition under the
substantial abuse standard was the debtor's ability to repay his debts. Using
these cases, the Kelly court announced, as a general rule, the proposition
that this ability to pay, standing alone, can justify a dismissal under section
707(b).
The Fourth Circuit agreed that a debtor's ability to repay his creditors
is the primary factor to be considered in a motion to dismiss a Chapter 7
petition, but criticized the Kelly court's holding that ability to repay could

B.R. 732, 738 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y 1987) (considering injuries and debtor's financial statements
as relevant factors) and In re Deaton, 65 B.R. 663, 664 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986) (holding
that factors other than debtor's ability to repay debt under Chapter 13 plan needed to find
substantial abuse under § 707(b)).
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serve as the
The Fourth
established
"substantial

sole factor used in making a determination to dismiss a petition.
Circuit looked to the legislative history of the amendment that
section 707(b) for insight into the appropriate definition of
abuse," but found that the history was not helpful. The court
then noted that the legislative history of section 707(a), which enumerates
causes for dismissal of debtor's bankruptcy petition, showed that Congress
had not contemplated whether a debtor's ability to repay constituted grounds
for dismissal. 9 The Green court held that the lack of any legislative
preference for the per se rule required a case-by-case analysis which would
take into consideration the totality of the circumstances.
The totality of the circumstances approach involves considering other
relevant factors, five of which the court enumerated: (1) sudden illness,
disability or unemployment; (2) cash advances and consumer purchases in
excess of the debtor's ability to repay; (3) excessiveness or unreasonableness
of the debtor's family budget; (4) accuracy of the debtor's income and
expense schedule; and (5) the debtor's good faith in petitioning for bankruptcy relief. The Green court stated that this approach allows a court to
determine with greater accuracy whether a creditor is abusing the Bankruptcy
Code by unfairly taking advantage of his creditors, which is the concern
that section 707(b) was intended to address.
The court's opinion also noted that section 707(b) contains a statutory
presumption in favor of granting a debtor's petition for Chapter 7 relief,
implying that solvency alone cannot constitute substantial abuse. Under the
per se rule an insolvent debtor would qualify for Chapter 7 protection and
a solvent debtor would not. The court would not consider other factors,
and a statutory presumption would serve no purpose. The Green court
found that this was not consistent with Congress' intent in enacting section
707(b). Furthermore, the court noted that the Bankruptcy Code does not
require that a debtor be insolvent in order to file for bankruptcy. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit's opinion emphasizes that the totality of the
circumstances analysis is preferable to the per se rule because it serves as a
better test for determining whether a debtor is attempting to abuse the
bankruptcy process, and is also consistent with the statutory presumption
in favor of granting a debtor's petition for Chapter 7 relief. As a result,
the court reversed the district court's opinion and remanded the case with
instructions that it be returned to the bankruptcy court to apply the five
enumerated factors.
One Illinois district court, in In re Fortune, 130 B.R. 525 (Bankr. C.D.
Ill. 1991), has cited the Green court's holding with approval, and rejected
the per se rule in favor of the totality of the circumstances test. The Green
court's adoption of the totality of the circumstances test, instead of the
Kelly court's per se rule, creates a split between the Fourth and the Ninth
Circuits. Although the court in Green agreed that the debtor's ability to

69. S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 94 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 5880.
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repay is the primary factor for a court to consider in deciding a motion to
dismiss a Chapter 7 petition, the court refused to make it the sole, dispositive
factor. Such a standard, in the Green court's opinion, is inconsistent with
the statute's legislative history and its presumption in favor of granting
Chapter 7 relief. Both the per se rule and totality of circumstances approaches find support in bankruptcy court opinions, but neither test is
dominant.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion prevents the
relitigation of an issue or issues actually litigated and necessarily decided in
a prior action before a court of competent jurisdiction. 70 Issue preclusion
will bar a party from relitigating an issue previously decided if that party
had "a full and fair opportunity" to litigate the issue in a prior suit. 7' The
doctrine of issue preclusion applies in a bankruptcy context, but before a
party may assert issue preclusion the bankruptcy court must
determine
' 72
whether the issue was actually litigated "with particular care.
In a bankruptcy proceeding, prior judgments against a debtor for fraud,
defalcation, embezzlement, and larceny are not dischargeable. 73 With these
principles in mind, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, in In re Raynor, 922 F.2d 1146 (4th Cir. 1991), considered the
issue of whether a prior default judgment for fraud, adverse to a bankruptcy
petitioner, will operate as issue preclusive and bar the discharge of the
judgment debt.
In Raynor, the creditor, M & M Transmissions, Inc. (M & M), contracted with AAA Distributors and Associates, Inc. (AAA) to purchase
automobile repair equipment. Subsequently, M & M brought suit in state
court in North Carolina against AAA and Charles G. Raynor, Sr. (Raynor),
as AAA's agent, alleging breach of contract, breach of express and implied
warranties, fraud, and unfair or deceptive trade practices. After being served
with process, Raynor retained an attorney, Donald E. Britt, Jr., to represent
him in the suit. Because settlement negotiations were in process, Britt did
not enter a formal appearance nor did Britt file an answer on behalf of
Raynor. Although a settlement agreement was reached and signed by Raynor, Raynor refused to abide by the agreement and the case was set for
trial on October 2, 1986. From the date of the agreement until the trial,
there was no communication between Britt and Raynor. After failing in his
attempts to contact Raynor, Britt moved, on the day of the trial, to withdraw
from the case. The trial court granted Britt's motion, and thus, Raynor
had neither notice of the trial and nor representation. The trial court,
finding AAA and Raynor liable on all counts alleged and granting punitive
damages, entered a default judgment against AAA and Raynor jointly and

70. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982).
71. Alien v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95 (1980).
72. Combs v. Richardson, 838 F.2d 112, 113 (4th Cir. 1988).
73. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (1988).
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severally in the amount of $226,000. In addition, the trial court awarded
M & M $15,000 in attorney's fees.
Raynor did not learn of the default judgment or of the withdrawal of
his attorney until M & M attempted to claim exempt property belonging to
Raynor. After learning of M & M's claim, Raynor, represented by new
counsel, moved for relief from the judgment, but the trial court denied his
motion. Raynor appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals. Finding
no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, the appeals court
affirmed the judgment in part and remanded with directions that M & M
elect a remedy under either the fraud claim or the unfair trade practices
claim. M & M elected the fraud remedy and the trial court entered judgment
for breach of contract, fraud, and punitive damages in the amount of
$144,000.
Next, Raynor voluntarily petitioned for bankruptcy and M & M initiated
an adversary proceeding to determine whether Raynor should be discharged
from the judgment debt. Raynor filed an answer stating that he had not
had an opportunity to present his defense before the trial court entered the
default judgment against him. M & M moved for summary judgment on
the grounds of issue preclusion. The bankruptcy court, finding that bankruptcy law and North Carolina law were similar with respect to the elements
of fraud and the standard of proof, applied the doctrine of issue preclusion
to the fraud issue and granted M & M motion for summary judgment. The
bankruptcy court entered judgment for M & M in the amount of $226,000
and denied dischargeability.
Raynor appealed to the United District Court for the Eastern District
of North Carolina. The district court affirmed the finding of the bankruptcy
court that the default judgment was res judicata on the issue of fraud and
that the debt was not dischargeable. But the district court corrected the
judgment entered by the bankruptcy court, reducing it to $144,000. Raynor
appealed the district court decision to the Fourth Circuit arguing that the
doctrine of issue preclusion does not apply to a default judgment for fraud
when dischargeability in a bankruptcy proceeding is at issue.
Initially, the Fourth Circuit recognized that Congress did not intend the
fresh start of a bankruptcy discharge to discharge an individual debtor from
any debt to the extent obtained by false pretenses, a false representation,
or actual fraud. However, the Fourth Circuit ruled that a default judgment,
even when rendered upon a claim of fraud, will not have preclusive effect
in the determination of dischargeability. The Fourth Circuit based its ruling
on Combs v. Richardson, 838 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1988), which required that
the determination of whether an issue had been actually litigated and
necessarily decided be made with "particular care," and upon In re Myers,
52 B.R. 901 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985) and the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments, both of which refuse to apply the doctrine of issue preclusion
to a default judgment.
In arriving at its conclusion, the Fourth Circuit paid special attention
to the fact that at no time was the issue of fraud actually litigated. The
issue of fraud was not litigated in state trial court because Raynor was
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unaware of the proceedings. When Raynor petitioned for relief from the
default judgment, the trial court did not address the issue of fraud, but
merely exercised its discretion to deny relief. There was no cross-examination
of M & M's witnesses, and the state trial court placed the burden of showing
a defense of fraud on Raynor. The Fourth Circuit found this burden
allocation to be contrary to the rule in bankruptcy which requires the party
who challenges discharge to bear the burden of proof. In the state appellate
court, the parties did not litigate and merely addressed the issue of whether
the state trial court had abused its discretion in denying relief from the
default judgment. Thus under the rule of In re Myers and the Restatement
(Second) of Judgments section 27 comment e, the Fourth Circtlit held that
a default judgment could not support issue preclusion and reversed the
judgment of the Federal District Court. The Fourth Circuit remanded the
case and directed the bankruptcy court to conduct evidentiary hearings on
the issue of fraud to determine whether Raynor should be discharged.
Judge Niemeyer, in a very strong dissent, disagreed with the majority's
conclusion that issue preclusion could not be applied to the facts of this
case. Instead, Judge Niemeyer believed the state court default judgment to
be a proper judgment and entitled to recognition by a bankruptcy court.
Feeling that Raynor had had his "full and fair opportunity" to litigate the
fraud issue in either the initial state court proceeding, in the motion for
relief from judgment, or in the state court of appeals, Judge Niemeyer
would have applied issue preclusion to the default judgment and denied
dischargeability. In reaching this conclusion, Judge Niemeyer placed special
emphasis on the fact that Raynor was no stranger to lawsuits. In fact
Raynor had been involved in at least eleven prior suits, each resulting in a
judgment adverse to Raynor. Thus, Judge Niemeyer voted to affirm the
Federal District Court's determination that issue preclusion did indeed apply
to the facts of this case.
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Raynor is in accord with the holding
of a majority of the other circuits that have addressed this issue. 74 Additionally, the Raynor holding is in line with the view of several commentators.7 5 Even though Judge Niemeyer recognizes the injustice which will occur
in this particular case, his view appears to be shared by only the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 76 Given the fact that the

74. See, In re McMillan, 579 F.2d 289 (3d Cir. 1978). The Third Circuit in McMillan
held that a default judgment had no collateral estoppel effect even as to facts which were
necessary to the default judgment; thus, the bankrupts were not collaterally estopped from

relitigating the same issues in a bankruptcy case where a creditor sought to have a claim and
default judgment for fraud and misrepresentation declared non-dischargeable. See also In re

Poston, 735 F.2d 866 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that debt incurred through false representations
and fraud did not have conclusive collateral estoppel effect as to subsequent determination of

nondischargeability of debt in bankruptcy case).
75. See, e.g., lB J. MOORE ET AL., MooRE's FEDERAL PR.ACTICE

IA

0.401 (2d ed. 1985);

17.16 (14th ed. 1973).
76. See Kelleran v. Andrijevic, 825 F.2d 692, 694 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that bankruptcy
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